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COULD A CLASSICAL THEIST BE A PHYSICALIST? 
William F. Vallicella 
Since physicalism is fashionable nowadays, one should perhaps not be too sur-
prised to find a growing number of theistic philosophers bent on combining 
theism with physicalism. I shall be arguing that this is an innovation we have 
good reason to resist. I begin by distinguishing global physicalism (physical-
ism about everything) from local physicalism (physicalism about human 
beings). I then present the theist who would be a physicalist with a challenge: 
Articulate a version of local physicalism that allows some minds to be purely 
material and others to be purely immaterial. After examining the main ver-
sions of local physicalism currently on offer, among them, type-type identity 
theory, supervenientism, emergentism and functionalism, I conclude that none 
of them can meet the challenge. 
God and the soul are two ideas that traditionally "go together." 
Logically, however, there is no prima facie inconsistency in positing one 
without the other. McTaggart famously denied God while affirming the 
souV whereas some contemporary theists, van Inwagen for example, 
deny the soul while affirming God.2 We will have our plates full if we 
confine our attention to the second denial-affirmation pair. Are theism 
and physicalism ultimately co-tenable positions?3 Can one hold, with 
better than prima facie logical consistency, both that there exists an omni-
qualified creator of the universe, a necessarily existent pure spirit, and 
yet that we creatures are not embodied spirits, but purely physical 
beings? 
l. Physicalism Global and Local 
One thing is clear. If physicalism or materialism4 is so defined as to 
imply the view that every concrete entity is physical, then theism and 
physicalism cannot both be true: God is a concrete, but not a physical, 
individuaP Here is David Lewis' stab at a definition: "Roughly speak-
ing, Materialism is the thesis that physics - something not too different 
from present-day physics, though presumably somewhat improved - is 
a comprehensive theory of the world, complete as well as correct."" For 
Tim Crane, "Physicalism is the thesis that all entities - whether objects, 
events, properties, relations or facts - are, or are reducible to, or are 
ontologically dependent on, physical entities."? If physicalism character-
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ized along these lines were true, it is clear that theism would be false, 
and contrapositively. 
But this article cannot end just yet. For physicalism might be, and 
sometimes is, taken more narrowly as a local response to a local prob-
lem, the mind-body problem. This is the problem of specifying the rela-
tion between the mental and the physical processes and states of those 
relatively few entities that pre-analytically are taken to have both. Van 
Inwagen, for example, tells us that "The thesis that human beings are 
physical things is called physicalism."8 Similarly for Thomas Nagel: "The 
view that people consist of nothing but physical matter, and that their 
mental states are physical states of their brains, is called physicalism (or 
sometimes materialism)."9 Along the same lines, Galen Straws on says 
that" According to materialism, every natural thing is wholly physi-
cal."'0 It is plain that these definitions do not rule out theism. If, for 
example, every natural thing is wholly physical, this is prima facie com-
patible with there being a supernatural thing which is not physical at all. 
We therefore need to distinguish between physicalism as a general 
ontological thesis to the effect that every entity, or perhaps every con-
crete entity, is physical, and physicalism as a special ontological thesis 
about those relatively few bodies that exhibit mentality. Call these glob-
al physicalism (GP) and local physicalism (LP), respectively. What 
exactly the thesis of local physicalism amounts to will of course depend 
on which version of local physicalism is being proposed. But every ver-
sion of (LP) involves the idea that the mental states and properties of 
physical beings are in some way necessarily "tied to" (identical with, 
supervenient upon, realized in, emergent from, composed of...) the 
physical states and properties of those same beings. (LP) thus appears 
sufficiently latitudinarian to allow the existence of nonphysical minds. 
For it talks only about the mental states of minded bodies (bodies that 
exhibit mentality), and says nothing about the mental states of disem-
bodied minds, if such there be. What it implies is that substance dual-
ism is false for minded bodies: minded bodies are not metaphysical 
composites, but simply physical systems. But (LP) does not rule out 
substance dualism in general since it allows for minds without associat-
ed bodies, and so allows for God and angels. 
So far, then, theism and local physicalism are prima facie co-tenable. 
Although (GP) entails atheism, (LP) does not appear to entail (GP), and 
so does not appear to entail atheism. What I want to argue, however, is 
that the appearance of co-tenability dissipates under closer scrutiny. 
II. Some Theologically Useless Physicalisms 
The problem for the theistic friend of physicalism is to find a way to 
be selectively physicalist, physicalist about embodied minds, but not 
about disembodied ones. To put it another way, the problem is to find a 
way to contain local physicalism so that it does not go global. The theist 
who would be a physicalist must find a theory that is physicalist about 
embodied minds while allowing for disembodied minds. 
Some write as if there is no particular difficulty here. Peter Forrest takes 
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physicalism to be "the thesis that necessarily there could not be ... imitation 
human beings, namely molecule-for-molecule replicas of ourselves that 
lack consciousness." I I He goes on to say that physicalism so characterized 
is "obviously compatible with theism."12 But is it? No doubt it is prima facie 
compatible with theism, but is it ultimately compatible? 
Note first that although physicalism about human beings entails the 
"no conscious replica" thesis, the former cannot be identified with the 
latter. Physicalism about human beings is not merely the view that such 
appropriately configured hunks of matter as functioning human brains 
cannot fail to be conscious, but that human consciousness ontologically 
and not just causally depends on matter. That is, (i) a functioning human 
brain (with the normal sensory inputs, etc.) is metaphysically sufficient 
for human consciousness, and (ii) a human brain (or some suitable phys-
ical replacement thereof) is metaphysically necessary for human con-
sciousness. (i) is a determination thesis to the effect that the physical 
features of an organism determine or "fix" its mental features; (ii) is an 
ontological dependency thesis to the effect that it is metaphysically 
impossible that (human) consciousness occur without a physical sub-
stratum. To omit claim (ii), and to let physicalism ride entirely on the 
determination thesis, is to allow the metaphysical possibility that my 
consciousness exist without being embodied. To call this "physicalism" 
would be a misuse of terms. For it would be indistinguishable from a 
form of substance dualism. Suppose I am a spirit contingently lodged in 
a human body. During my bodily tenure, my ordinary consciousness is 
determined by the functioning of my brain and central nervous system 
such that an exact replica of me could not fail to be conscious. But at 
death and during mystical experiences in life I qua spirit enjoy forms of 
awareness not determined by the functioning of any physical system. 
Surely no one will want to call such a view "physicalism" even though it 
implies that I cannot have a molecule-for-molecule replica that lacks 
consciousness. 
So let us charitably supplement Forrest's definition with the ontologi-
cal dependency claim, claim (ii) above. I will now argue that if con-
sciousness in humans is onto logically dependent upon a physical sub-
stratum, then consciousness in general is also so dependent. 
Forrest cogently argues that the modal operator in his definition 
should be taken to express metaphysical and not merely nomological 
necessity, where metaphysical necessity is distinguished from both nar-
rowly logical and analytic necessity.13 Granting this, we may however 
inquire into the ground of the metaphysical necessity that no human 
being or other embodied mind have a molecule-for-molecule replica that 
lacks consciousness, and that consciousness in humans be onto logically 
dependent upon a material substratum. The ground of narrowly logical 
necessities (e.g., "Every byte is a byte") resides in logical form; the 
ground of analytic necessities (e.g., "A bit is a binary digit") in meaning; 
and that of nomological necessities in laws of nature. Presumably, the 
ground of a metaphysical necessity lies in the natures of the entities 
involved; in the present case, in the natures of consciousness and matter. 
That is to say, consciousness by its very nature cannot occur unless "tied 
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to" (identical with, supervenient upon, emergent from, realized in, com-
posed of ... ) physical items (substances, events, states ... ). If so, con-
sciousness wherever it occurs, whether in God or Satan or Socrates, is 
necessarily "tied" to the physical. For if some minds are by nature 
"tied" to the physical, then all minds, including God's, are by nature so 
"tied." Deny that and you are either equivocating on "mind" or deny-
ing that mentality has an intrinsic nature.14 But then it is clear that 
Forrest's version of local physicalism is not "obviously compatible with 
theism." At the very least, what this preliminary skirmish shows is that 
there is a serious problem about the ultimate coherence of local physical-
ism and theism. But now on to the details. 
My strategy will be to consider the different versions of physicalism 
currently on offer and to see which of them, if any, can be of use to the 
selective physicalist. This section dispatches five theologically useless 
physicalisms: eliminativism, type-type identity theory, supervenientism, 
emergentism, and what may be termed "the constitution view." The fol-
lowing section turns to functionalism which, I believe, holds out the 
only hope for the selective physicalist. 
A. We may begin by summarily eliminating the eminently eliminable 
doctrine of eliminative physicalism according to which mental states 
and events enjoy the status of witches, goblins and magnetic effluvia. 
This is surely a "lunatic philosophy of mind"15 in that it denies the very 
data that inspire a philosophy of mind in the first place. Consciousness 
is nothing like phlogiston.16 In any case, no classical theist could possi-
bly be an eliminativist. 
B. Given the crashingly obvious fact that mental phenomena are real, 
one way to insure both their reality and their scientific respectability is 
to identify them with what are unproblematically real and doubtlessly 
respectable, physical phenomena. The type-type identity theorist identi-
fies mental properties with physical properties of the sort instantiated in 
our brains. Thus pain is not merely correlated with A-Delta fiber stimu-
lation, but is identical with the latter. This carries the "species-chauvin-
istic" implication that beings lacking our neurophysiological constitu-
tion could never be in mental states. A fortiori, it implies that beings 
lacking any neurophysiological, indeed any physical, constitution could 
never be in mental states. It is therefore clear that the type-type identity 
theory has global implications: it implies the impossibility of disembod-
ied minds, and thus the impossibility of a divine mind. The selective 
physicalist can find no purchase here. It would be a contradiction to say 
that (i) every mental property is identical to some physical property of 
human beings, and (ii) there is a mental property that is exemplified by 
a being that has no physical properties. Note also that (i), if true, is nec-
essarily true. Since (i) entails the negation of (ii), the negation of (ii) is 
necessarily true. Thus, if (i) is true, then it is necessarily true that there is 
no mental property that is exemplified by a being that has no physical 
properties. So if type-identity physicalism is true, the existence of God 
and angels is impossible. Contra positively, if the latter are so much as 
possible, type-identity physicalism is false. 
C. Philosophers justifiably uncomfortable with reductive physicalism 
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have proposed the nonreductive idea that mental properties are not 
identical with, but merely supervene upon, physical properties in the 
way in which ethical properties have been thought (by G. E. Moore, R. 
M. Hare, and others) to supervene upon natural or descriptive proper-
ties. Suppose A and B are both ethically good. It does not follow that 
there is anyone natural, non-disjunctive, property with which goodness 
can be identified. Perhaps A is good in virtue of being brave and trust-
worthy, whereas B is good in virtue of being temperate and just. 
Goodness is in this sense "multiply realizable." A and B are both good 
despite the fact that their goodness is realized by different natural prop-
erties. 17 Nevertheless, (i) a person cannot be good unless there is some 
natural property in virtue of whose possession he is good, and (ii) if a 
person is good in virtue of possessing certain natural properties, then 
anyone possessing the same natural properties must also be good. 
Given that A-properties supervene upon B-properties, the "superve-
nience T-shirt" might read: "No A-property without a B-property" on 
the front; "same B-properties, same A-properties" on the back. As 
Jaegwon Kim puts it, "The core idea of supervenience as a relation 
between two families of properties is that the supervenient properties 
are in some sense determined by, or dependent upon, the properties on 
which they supervene."IS 
Kim's preferred way of cashing this out is in terms of strong superve-
nience. Let A and B be families of properties closed under such Boolean 
operations as complementation, conjunction and disjunction. A strongly 
supervenes on B just in case: 
(SS) Necessarily, for any property F in A, if any object x has F, then 
there exists a property G in B such that x has G, and necessarily 
anything having G has F. 
To obtain the definiens of weak supervenience, we simply delete the final 
"necessarily" in (SS). Accordingly, A weakly supervenes on B just in case: 
(WS) Necessarily, for any property F in A, if any object x has F, 
then there exists a property G in B such that x has G, and anything 
having G has F. 19 
On (SS), the base properties fix the supervenient properties in a 
trans world manner; on (WS) in a merely intra world manner. There is 
also global supervenience to consider. A globally supervenes on B just in 
case: 
(GS) Worlds that are indiscernible with respect to B ("B-indis-
cernible" for short) are also A-indiscernible.20 
To say that two worlds are B- or A-indiscernible is to say that they share 
the same total pattern of distribution of B- or A-properties. 
Peter Forrest has argued that global supervenience physicalism is 
compatible with the belief in a non-physical, non-contingent god if we 
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are willing to make certain speculative assumptions.21 Given that God 
exists in every metaphysically possible world, no two worlds differ in 
point of the divine existence. And if God can create only physical things 
- this is one of the speculative assumptions - then no two worlds in 
which God creates will differ without differing in a physical respect. 22 
Thus there appears to be a variant of classical theism that is compatible 
with a version of supervenience physicalism. For what global superve-
nience physicalism says is that if there is a mental difference between 
two worlds, then there is a physical difference between them. If God 
exists in every possible world, and creates only physical things in the 
worlds in which He creates anything, then His existence and actions 
never contribute to a mental difference between worlds, and so His exis-
tence is consistent with the constraint that (G5) lays down. 
But this is unsatisfactory, for several reasons. First, a variant of classical 
theism in which God cannot create non-physical things is a variant in 
which angels are not even possible. And so Forrest's argument is of no 
use to a Christian or an Islamic classical theist who would be a physicalist. 
A second and more important reason is that it is unclear what it could 
mean for God's mental properties to supervene globally on physical 
properties. Consider a pair of worlds in which there are physical objects 
but no minds except God. In these worlds the mental properties (= 
God's mental properties) globally supervene upon the physical proper-
ties because there is no mental difference between the worlds and hence 
no mental difference without a physical difference. Now global super-
venience is supervenience (in the way in which lias-if" intentionality is 
not intentionality), and supervenience is supposed to capture the ideas 
of dependence and determination as relations between sets of proper-
ties. But none of God's intrinsic properties depends for its instantiation 
on the instantiation of any physical property. There is no sense in which 
any of God's intrinsic properties need physical properties to realize them. 
If this isn't obvious, think of a world in which God exists but nothing 
physical exists. And no physical property is such that its instantiation 
determines (suffices for) the instantiation of any of God's intrinsic proper-
ties. If per impossibile God were not to exist, or exist bare of properties, 
the instantiation of no physical property would make Him exist or make 
Him have any property. Furthermore, the only sense in which God's 
intrinsic mental properties vary with physical properties is the trivial 
sense in which, since they do not vary, they satisfy the conditional, "If 
there is a variation in mental properties, then there is a variation in 
physical properties." Thus there is no non-trivial sense in which God's 
mental properties supervene on physical properties, and thus in our pair 
of worlds, no non-trivial sense in which mental properties in those 
worlds supervene on the physical properties. So although (G5)-physi-
calism permits the existence of a non-contingent god, this permissive-
ness is purchased at the expense of eviscerating the concept of superve-
nience of the notions of dependence and determination that it was intro-
duced to express. (G5) is just too weak and liberal to be of use in formu-
lating nonreductive physicalism. 
Along the same lines, and apart from the God question, Kim has per-
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suasively argued that global supervenience is too weak a notion to cap-
ture the idea that mental properties are dependent upon, or determined 
by, physical properties.23 For " .. .it is consistent with this version of mate-
rialism [global supervenience physicalism] for there to be a world which 
differs from this world in some most trifling respect (say, 5aturn's rings 
in that world contain one more ammonia molecule) but which is entirely 
devoid of consciousness, or has a radically different, perhaps totally 
irregular, distribution of mental characteristics over its inhabitants (say, 
creatures with brains have no mentality while rocks are conscious)."2' 
Kim also points out that " ... global psychophysical supervenience is con-
sistent with there being within a given world, perhaps this one, two 
physically indistinguishable organisms with radically different psycho-
logical attributes."25 
There is a further reason why global supervenience is too weak to be 
of use in formulating a serious version of physicalism: it allows for 
Cartesian psychophysical supervenience, or what we might call super-
venience dualism. For the global supervenience of mental on physical 
properties is consistent with the mental properties being possessed by 
irreducibly mental substances and the physical properties being pos-
sessed by physical substances. There is nothing in the concept of global 
supervenience to rule out multiple domain supervenience in the way in 
which (55) and (W5) do rule out multiple domain supervenience.26 That 
is, if mental properties strongly or weakly supervene on physical ones, 
then necessarily if an individual has a mental property, then that very 
same individual has a physical property, and presumably not just any 
old physical property, but one that "realizes" the mental property; 
whereas if mental properties globally supervene on physical ones, there 
is the possibility that the set of possessors of the mental properties and 
the set of possessors of the physical properties be disjoint. But this pos-
sibility would of course tend to eviscerate the idea that the physical 
properties "realize" the mental properties: To say that my mind cannot 
have a mental property unless my brain has a physical property, and 
that there cannot be a difference in mental properties without a differ-
ence in physical properties is not by a long shot to say that the physical 
properties "realize" the mental properties.27 It is merely to say that my 
mental properties "co-vary" with my physical properties. If superve-
nience is nothing more than covariation, then it cannot get the length of 
dependence, determination or realization. 
This brief exposition of the concept of property supervenience suf-
fices to make it clear that the theistic physicalist can find no refuge in the 
fashionable precincts of property supervenience physicalism. Global 
property supervenience has been disqualified. And if mental properties 
strongly or weakly supervene upon physical properties, then no mental 
property can be instantiated by an individual unless there is a corre-
sponding subvenient physical property that is instantiated by the same 
individual. On (55)- and (W5)-physicalism, nothing can have mental 
properties unless it also has physical properties that "realize" the mental 
properties. Since God has no physical properties, the supervenience 
physicalist must judge that He lacks the subvenience base necessary to 
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support a mental life. Supervenience physicalism thus does not meet 
the challenge: it does not allow for some minds to be wholly immaterial 
while others are not. 
Given that the necessity operators in (SS) and (WS) can be read either 
metaphysically or nomologically, one might wonder whether my con-
clusion is affected if the modal force of the 'can' in the third to last sen-
tence - Nothing can have mental properties unless it also has physical 
properties ... - is taken nomologically. If so taken, then there are meta-
physically possible worlds in which mental properties are exemplified 
without subvenient physical properties. Thus strong nomological 
supervenience physicalism, unlike type-identity physicalism, does not 
rule out the metaphysical possibility of disembodied mentality. But it 
does rule out the possibility of a world in which human mentality is 
supervenient on the physical and divine mentality is not. And that is all 
I need for my conclusion. The question is whether there is any meta-
physically possible world in which some minds are purely material and 
others purely spiritual; the question is not whether there are worlds in 
which there are disembodied minds. 
Kim takes the relata of the supervenience relation to be properties, or 
families thereof. But one might also take the relata of this relation to be 
individual events and states. For John Searle, "the supervenience of the 
mental on the physical is marked by the fact that physical states are 
causally sufficient, though not necessarily causally necessary, for the 
corresponding mental states."28 In other words, "sameness of neuro-
physiology guarantees sameness of mentality; but sameness of mentality 
does not guarantee sameness of neurophysiology."29 Searle sees the con-
cept of supervenience, insofar as it is relevant to the mind-body prob-
lem, as a causal notion, whereas Kim as Searle understands him sees it 
as what the latter calls a "constitutive" notion.3D To illustrate the differ-
ence, the supervenience of goodness on natural properties is the for-
mer's being constituted, not caused, by the latter. 
But however one construes supervenience, whether as a constitutive 
relation between properties, or as a causal relation between states and 
events, the fact remains that supervenience physicalism is of no use to 
the theist who would be a physicalist about human beings. For God has 
physical states as little as He has physical properties. 
D. Similar remarks apply to emergentism since, as Kim has persua-
sively argued, emergentism and supervenience physicalism are practical-
ly indistinguishable.3' But here we need to make a distinction between 
property-emergentism and substance-emergentism. Kim's discussion 
pertains to the former; I will say something about the latter a few para-
graphs hence. Kim squeezes property-emergentism into three theses: 
[Ultimate Physicalist Ontology] There are basic, nonemergent enti-
ties and properties, and these are material entities and their funda-
mental physical properties. 
[Property Emergence] When aggregates of basic entities attain a 
certain level of structural complexity ("relatedness"), genuinely 
novel properties emerge to characterize these structured aggre-
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gates. Moreover, these emergent properties emerge only when 
appropriate "basal" conditions are present. 
[The Irreducibility of Emergentsl Emergent properties are "novel" 
in that they are not reductively explainable in terms of the condi-
tions out of which they emerge. 
As Kim points out, 'M is emergent from P' is just another way of saying 
that 'M strongly supervenes on P.'32 Given this, it is clear that superve-
nience physicalists subscribe to the above trio of theses. 
If this is right, then only physical individuals can have mental proper-
ties, and this suffices to show that property-emergentism is theologically 
useless, and for the same reasons that supervenience physicalism is. But 
there is also substance-emergentism to consider. Substances are meta-
physically capable of independent existence. So if there are substance 
emergents, they are entities capable of existing apart from their emer-
gence base once they have emerged. 
William Hasker sketches such a position.33 Think of a magnet and the 
magnetic field it generates. The field is plausibly viewed as an individ-
ual or substance emergent rather than as a property emergent. The field 
depends for its existence on the magnet but is not a mere epiphenome-
non of it: the field causally affects nearby metal objects. So, Hasker 
asks, why can't sufficiently complex states and processes in living 
organisms generate "conscious fields" {"psychic fields," "soul-fields")?34 
E. J. Lowe develops a similar position according to which conscious-
ness is "an emergent feature of biological evolution ... but not itself a bio-
logical phenomenon."35 A contrast with Searle will throw Lowe's posi-
tion into relief. Searle too thinks of consciousness as emergent, but holds 
that it is a "biological phenomenon like any other."36 Thus there are two 
notions of emergence at work here. Searle calls them, mirabile dictu, 
emergencel and emergence2; Lowe makes the same distinction using 
"weak emergence" and "strong emergence." For Searle, consciousness 
is a causally emergent property of systems of neurons in the same way 
that solidity and liquidity are emergent features of systems of 
molecules.37 This is emergencel. Much stronger and not endorsed by 
Searle is emergence2: "A feature F is emergent2 iff F is emergentl and F 
has causal powers that cannot be explained by the causal powers of a, b, 
c .... If consciousness were emergent2, then consciousness could cause 
things that could not be explained by the causal behavior of the neu-
rons."38 For Searle, then, consciousness is only weakly emergent and 
thus has no independent causal powers. For Lowe, by contrast, con-
sciousness is strongly emergent: it has independent causal powers, and 
its possession of such powers is a good reason to ascribe substance sta-
tus to consciousness.39 An organism's consciousness, then, is an emer-
gent substance or individual rather than an emergent property or fea-
ture. Consciousness may be causally dependent on the brain, but such 
dependence is not a good reason to deny substance status to conscious-
ness. One substance can be causally dependent on another without prej-
udice to its being a substance. 
Suppose Hasker and Lowe are right and consciousness in humans is 
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strongly emergent (emergent2). Strong emergentism makes for a partial 
rapprochement between theism and physicalism in that it allows for the 
possibility of the soul's post mortem existence."ll It is metaphysically 
impossible that an emergent property continue to exist after the system 
from which it has emerged has ceased to exist; but it seems metaphysi-
cally possible that an emergent substance continue to exist after the sys-
tem from which it has emerged has ceased to exist."l 
Be this as it may, our central problem is left untouched, since it is 
clear that divine and angelic consciousness is not emergent, whether 
weakly or strongly. It is analytic that emergence is emergence from a 
physical base, and in the case of God and angels classically conceived 
there is no physical baseY Moreover, it is analytic that to emerge is to 
come into being, and God's consciousness does not come into being. If it 
is the nature of consciousness to emerge from sufficiently complex physi-
cal systems, then every case of consciousness must be a case of emer-
gence. Thus strong emergentism cannot meet the challenge: it cannot 
explain how some minds are material while others are wholly immateri-
al. But I hear an objection coming. 
"One may hold that it is the nature of human (or, more generally, 
embodied) consciousness to be emergent while also holding that divine 
and angelic consciousness is non-emergent." I reply that this is incoher-
ent. Let me work up to this conclusion in steps. No one will suggest 
that while Bill's consciousness is emergent, Phil's is non-emergent. Nor 
will anyone say that consciousness in humans is emergent, but con-
sciousness in cats is non-emergent, perhaps because the type-type iden-
tity theory is true of them. Nor is anyone likely to maintain that humans 
and Alpha Centaurians differ in that emergentism is true of the former, 
whereas substance dualism is true of the latter. All such proposals will 
be rightly judged to be incoherent. Why exactly? Well, we naturally 
assume a sort of Principle of Ontological Uniformity according to which 
any metaphysical answers to questions of the form What is X? (where 
typical values of "X" are causation, time, truth, existence, consciousness, 
etc.) attempt to lay bare the nature of X, a nature which to be a nature 
must remain invariant across space, time, and possible worlds. 
Now if the above proposals are incoherent, why is it not equally inco-
herent to suppose that emergentism is true of human beings, but not 
true of God and angels? Consciousness is consciousness. If its nature is 
such that in some cases it is emergent, then it must be emergent in all 
cases. Either every case of consciousness is emergent, or none is. 
Similarly, either every case of liquidity is an emergent property of a sys-
tem of molecules, or none is. It would be incoherent to maintain that the 
liquidity of water on earth is an emergent property while the liquidity of 
water on Mars is non-emergent, say a property of individual molecules. 
Not that this is not narrowly logically possible; it is. But it is also nar-
rowly logically possible that the chemical composition of water has 
changed over time, that water in the time of Thales was an element, in 
the time of Dalton was HO, and later became H20. What is narrowly 
logically possible may be metaphysically impossible, and I should think 
it is metaphysically (and not just nomologically) impossible both that the 
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emergence status of liquidity vary from place to place and that the 
chemical composition of water vary across time. 
Another view bearing affinities to emergentism is that of Aquinas as 
interpreted by Eleonore Stump. For Stump's Aquinas, "Mental proper-
ties are emergent ... insofar as they are features which are dependent on 
the configuration and composition of the whole; they are not identical to 
the properties of the material parts of the whole, but they emerge from 
the properties and dynamic interactions of those parts."41 For Stump's 
Aquinas, "the mind emerges from the functioning of the brain ... "45 Is the 
mind then an emergent property, or a conjunction of emergent proper-
ties? This seems to follow from the two quotations. 
Suppose the mind is an emergent property. Several difficulties arise 
of which I will mention two. First, it is difficult to see how an emergent 
property can continue to exist after the physical system from which it 
has emerged has ceased to exist. Indeed I said a while back that such a 
thing is metaphysically impossible. Why exactly? Well, you will grant 
that an emergent property cannot exist before the systems from which it 
will emerge have themselves begun to exist. Thus it would make hash 
of the idea that consciousness is an emergent property to say that this 
property existed at the time of the Big Bang but had to wait around for 
some 15 billion years before it could emerge. Emergence of a property is 
not the becoming exemplified of a pre-existent property; it is the coming 
into existence of a novel property. Emergent properties cannot exist 
unexemplified, whence it follows that an emergent property of a system 
cannot exist after systems of that type no longer exist. And so if the 
mind (the intellective part of the human soul) is an emergent property, 
then the mind metaphysically cannot exist apart from the body. 
Aquinas' view, however, is that the soul, and hence the mind, can exist 
apart from the body even though this is an "unnatural" state for it to be 
in. The first difficulty, then, is that it is impossible to see how the mind 
can be a property-emergent and yet be capable of existence apart from 
the body. 
A second, and more fundamental, difficulty concerns whether or not 
it is consistent to interpret Aquinas as an emergentist given that he holds 
that "the human soul is different from all other forms that configure 
matter" since "It is created directly by God and infused into matter."46 If 
"emergence" means anything at all, it means that that which emerges, 
whether a property or an individual, (i) emerges from a physical system, 
(ii) emerges only when that system achieves the requisite level of com-
plexity, and (iii) does so "automatically," i.e., without any additional 
agency. Given this understanding of "emergence," the soul as a form 
"created directly by God and infused into matter" cannot be an emer-
gent entity. 
Since Aquinas' position is so far from anything recognizable as physi-
calism - it is perhaps best thought of as a form of non-Cartesian dual-
ism - it does not represent a position in which physicalism and theism 
achieve reconciliation. 
E. Besides supervenience physicalism and emergentism, there is 
another sort of nonreductive physicalism, call it "the constitution view." 
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Lynne Rudder Baker takes this line, according to which "persons are 
constituted by bodies, but are not identical to bodies."'s Just as 
Michaelangelo'S David is constituted by a particular hunk H of marble, 
but not identical to H, Smith is constituted by a particular body B, but is 
not identical to B. We may grant for the sake of argument that David 
and H are not identical. One reason for this is that there are possible 
worlds in which H exists but David does not. Think of a world in which 
H exists, but no works of art exist. Since David is a work of art, in such a 
world H exists but David does not. But if it is possible that H and David 
not be identical, then they are not identical. (By the contrapositive of the 
Necessity of Identity, to wit, if x = y, then necessarily, x = y.) 
Similarly, Baker thinks, there are worlds in which B exists but Smith 
does not. Think of a world in which B exists, but does not stand in the 
relations necessary to make it a person. A person, no less than a statue, 
is the thing it is in virtue of its "intentionally specified relational proper-
ties."49 A person, then, cannot be identical to its body. 
Without entering any deeper into Baker's position, a rather obvious 
objection obtrudes itself: If persons are constituted by their bodies, then 
there cannot be a person without a body. Baker says as much: "It is nec-
essary that Smith have a body, but is not necessary that Smith have the 
particular body that she actually has."50 But in that case neither God nor 
angels/ devils nor the souls of the departed can exist. Obviously, God 
and finite spirits are persons without bodies. The "constitution view" 
thus rules out theism. 
This objection is so simple that it may arouse suspicion; but I prefer to 
say that here is a case where simplex sigillum veri. Note that we can't just 
make an exception for God and the heavenly hosts. Besides being irre-
sponsibly ad hoc, that would involve saying that some persons, namely 
us, are essentially embodied, whereas other persons, namely God and 
angels/ devils, are not essentially embodied. But that is as incoherent as 
saying that some samples of (pure) water are identically H20, whereas 
other such samples are not identically H20. Given that water has a 
nature, that nature is invariant across time, space and possible worlds. 
Given that personhood has a nature, the same holds true of it: if embod-
iment is essential to personhood, then there can be no disembodied per-
sons. If some persons are essentially embodied, all are. It seems that the 
only way to evade the objection is by denying that personhood has a 
nature. This brings us to functionalism. 
III. Functionalism 
If you are tempted to functionalism, I believe you do not need refu-
tation, you need help. - John Searles1 
The theist who is also a (noneliminative) physicalist about human 
beings is committed to the idea that some token mental states, namely 
God's, are distinct from every token physical state, while other token 
mental states, namely ours, are identical with physical states. This is a 
strange idea made stranger still if you adjoin the plausible view that if x 
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= y, then necessarily x = y, and if x is distinct from y, then necessarily x is 
distinct from y. How could some mental states be necessarily physical 
while others are necessarily nonphysical? That would be to deny that 
mental phenomena have an intrinsic nature." Consider an analogy. 
How could some cats be animals and other cats be inanimate robots, 
even if the latter were behaviorally indiscernible from the former? After 
all, it is the nature of a cat to be an animal; hence a robotic "cat" is not a 
cat. "Cat" picks out a biological kind, not a functional role. Similarly, 
one will be tempted to say that it is the nature of mental states to be 
either all of them physical or all of them nonphysical. How could men-
tality straddle such a deep categorial divide? 
The functionalist response will be to deny that mental states have an 
intrinsic nature. On (ontological as opposed to semantic) functionalism, 
what makes a mental state mental is just the causal role it plays in medi-
ating between sensory inputs, behavioral outputs and other internal 
states of the subject in question. The idea is not the banality that mental 
events typically (or even always) have causes and effects, but that it is 
causal role occupancy, nothing more and nothing less, that constitutes 
the mentality of a mental state. The intrinsic nature of what plays the 
role is relevant only to its fitness for instantiating mental causal roles, 
but not at all relevant to its being a mental state. (You can't make a pis-
ton out of chewing gum, but being made of steel is no part of what 
makes a piston a piston. A piston is what it does.) 
To illustrate, suppose my cat Zeno and I are startled out of our 
respective reveries by a loud noise at time t. Given the differences 
between human and feline brains, presumably man and cat are not in 
type-identical brain states at t. (If you doubt this, substitute for Zeno 
Meno the Martian cat or Reno the silicon-headed robot "cat.") Yet both 
man and cat are startled: both are in some sense in the very same men-
tal state, even though the states they are in are neither token- nor type-
identical. The functionalist will hold that we are in functionally the 
same mental state in virtue of the fact that Zeno's brain state plays the 
same causal role in him as my brain state plays in me. It does the same 
mediatorial job vis-a-vis sensory inputs, other internal states, and behav-
ioral output in me as the cat's brain state does in him. 
On functionalism, then, the mentality of the mental is wholly relation-
al. And as Armstrong points out, "If the essence of the mental is purely 
relational, purely a matter of what causal role is played, then the logical 
possibility remains that whatever in fact plays the causal role is not 
material."53 This implies that "Mental states might be states of a spiritual 
substance."54 Here 1 think lies the only hope for the theist who aspires to 
be a physicalist about human beings. Recall that the difficulty is to 
explain how some minds can be purely material and others purely spiri-
tual (and thus immaterial). If functionalism is true, there can be purely 
material and purely immaterial minds and mental states because "the 
essence of the mental is purely relational." Thus on functionalism God 
and Socrates can be in type-identical mental states even though Socrates' 
mental states are token-identical to neural states while God's are token-
identical to states of a spiritual substance. 
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Unfortunately for the selective physicalist, (i) functionalism is a mon-
umentally implausible theory of mind, and (ii) even if true for us, could 
not possibly be true for God. It is also worth noting that if functionalism 
is false for God, and God is a possible being, then functionalism is false 
tout court. 
Ad (i). There are the technical objections that have spawned a pelagic 
literature: absent qualia, inverted qualia, the "Chinese nation," etc. 
Thrusting these aside, we go for the throat Searle-style. 
First, functionalism is threatened by a fundamental incoherence. 55 
The theory says that what makes a state a mental state is nothing intrin-
sic to the state, but purely relational: a matter of its causes and effects. 
In us, these states happen to be neural. Now every neural state has 
causes and effects, but not every neural state is a mental state. So the 
distinction between mental and nonmental neural states must be 
accounted for in terms of a distinction between two different sets of 
causes and effects, those that contribute to mentality and those that do 
not. But how make this distinction? How do the causes/ effects of men-
tal neural events differ from the causes/ effects of nonmental neural 
events? Equivalently, how do psychologically salient input/ output 
events differ from those that lack such salience? 
Suppose the display on my monitor is too bright for comfort and I 
decide to do something about it. Why is it that photons entering my 
retina are psychologically salient inputs but those striking the back of 
my head are not? Why is it that the moving of my hand to adjust the 
brightness and contrast controls is a salient output event, while unno-
ticed perspiration is not? 
One may be tempted to say that the psychologically salient inputs are 
those that contribute to the production of the uncomfortable glare sensa-
tion, and the psychologically salient outputs are those that manifest the 
concomitant intention to make an adjustment. But then the salient 
input/ output events are being picked out by reference to mental events 
taken precisely not as causal role occupants, but as exhibiting intrinsic 
features that are neither causal nor neural. The functionalist would then 
be invoking the very thing he is at pains to deny, namely, mental events 
as having more than neural and causal features. 
Clearly, one moves in a circle of embarrassingly short diameter if one 
says: (i) mental events are mental because of the mental causal roles they 
play, and (ii) mental causal roles are those whose occupants are mental 
events. 
A second fundamental objection to functionalism, equal in Searlean 
brutality unto the first, is this. If fitting into a causal pattern is what 
makes a state mental, then two scenarios which seem possible are really 
impossible. In the one, a person's conscious experience gradually fades 
out, while sensory input and behavioral output remain the same. In the 
second scenario, there is blooming, buzzing conscious experience but 
paralysis blocks its behavioral manifestation. As noted, on functional-
ism both scenarios are impossible. For if the mentality of a mental state 
is just its functional role, how could conscious experience fade out as 
long as that role was being instantiated? And how could conscious 
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experience continue to occur, if all causal links to behavioral manifesta-
tion were severed? 
But presumably both scenarios are metaphysically possible. Indeed, 
there are cases in which the second is actual. And so Modus Tollens 
assures us that functionalism is false. This is quick, I know, but details 
are available elsewhere.56 
Ad (ii). Even if the above objections can be successfully met, it will 
still remain impossible for functionalism to be true of God. A functional-
ist analysis cannot succeed unless inputs and outputs can be specified. 
In the case of human beings, the difficulty was to specify, in a noncircu-
lar way, which of the sensory inputs and behavioral outputs are psycho-
logically salient. But in the divine case, the problem is far worse: it is to 
explain how God can have inputs and outputs at all. 
What is God's input? Since input is a causal notion, God can have an 
input only if He can be acted upon, which is not at all clear, and is posi-
tively ruled out on some classical conceptions of God. And even if He 
were acted upon, He could not be acted upon by any physical object or 
process. You can't send a light signal to God. The divine input cannot 
be a sensory input. If God is acted upon by some such purely spiritual 
means as a mortal's petitionary prayer, then physicalism about human 
beings has been abandoned. But even if the problem of the divine input 
is solved, other questions arise. 
What is God's output? It cannot be bodily behavior, since God has no 
body. But perhaps a body is not necessary for behavior. Perhaps God 
behaves by intentionally bringing about states of affairs, by creating a 
world for example.57 
But now consider a possible world W in which God exists but creates 
nothing. There must be such a world since God as traditionally defined 
- and that is the definition of "God" with which we are working -
necessarily exists but contingently creates.58 In W there is no divine out-
put. But there is no divine input either. All there is in W is God and 
"abstract objects," numbers, (Fregean) propositions and the like, all of 
which are plausibly identified with divine concepts. So all there is in W 
is God alone with His thoughts.59 With a bit of Aristotelian exaggera-
tion, we may say that all there is is noesis noeseos. In W, God neither acts 
nor is acted upon. Now if functionalism were true, God would be in no 
occurrent mental state in W. For on functionalism, what makes a state 
mental is nothing intrinsic to the state, but consists entirely in its rela-
tions to inputs, outputs and other internal states. The being mental of a 
state precisely is its occupancy of a causal role that mediates between 
inputs and outputs. If there are no inputs and outputs, there is nothing 
to mediate, no job to do, with the upshot that none of God's states are 
mental states. But of course God is occurrently conscious in W - He is 
for example occurrently aware of the infinity of mathematical truths, 
though not necessarily in the way we are aware of any set of such truths 
- and so functionalism cannot be a true theory of the divine mental life 
inW. 
Now if there is one possible world in which functionalism is not a 
true theory of the divine mental life, then there is no world in which it is 
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a true theory of the divine mental life. Functionalism, if true, is neces-
sarily true: it is not the contingent thesis that causal role merely hap-
pens to constitute mentality, i.e., constitutes it in some possible worlds 
but not in others. So whatever may be the case with our mental lives, it 
is surely true of the divine mental life that "Ontologically speaking, 
behavior, functional role, and causal relations are irrelevant to the exis-
tence of conscious mental phenomena."6D 
This is also clear from the fact that God is by definition an absolute 
mind. God doesn't have a mind or exhibit mentality; He doesn't behave 
in ways that allow us to ascribe mentality to Him; God is (identically) a 
mind. Moreover, God's being a mind cannot consist in His relations to 
other things. For there are possible worlds in which God exists but there 
are no other things. But this stands in diametric opposition to function-
alism according to which it is precisely relations to other things that 
makes mental states mental. If the mind has a relational essence, then 
there cannot be an absolute mind, in which case God cannot exist. 
Functionalism as a semantic theory, a theory about the meaning of 
mental concepts, may be of use in explaining how some mental predi-
cates can be applied univocally to God and creatures.6l But functional-
ism as an ontological theory, a theory that purports to tell the whole truth 
about what mental states are, is useless for purposes of showing how a 
theist can be a physicalist about human beings. Functionalism cannot be 
true of God, and so if functionalism is true, God cannot exist. 
Contrapositively, if God so much as possibly exists, then functionalism 
is false. But if functionalism won't work for purposes of reconciling the-
ism and physicalism, it is not clear that any other version of physicalism 
can do better. 
There is a final, related point. William P. Alston approvingly points 
out that, on functionalism, " ... the point of having knowledge, beliefs, 
memories, perceptions, is that they provide us with the information we 
need to get around in our environment in the pursuit of goals."n2 This 
strikes me as conspicuously false for God as classically conceived and 
rather dubious for us, reflecting as it does a behaviorist-pragmatist prej-
udice that comports none too well with classical theism and the vision of 
the human good associated with it. If "point" means ultimate purpose, 
then clearly God does not enjoy knowledge for the ultimate purpose of 
getting around in the environment as if He were an organism struggling 
to survive in a nature red in tooth and claw.'" God presumably enjoys 
knowledge for its own sake, not for the sake of some extrinsic end. Nor 
is it the case that in us the ultimate purpose of having knowledge, 
beliefs, memories and the rest is to facilitate adaptation to our environ-
ment and the successful pursuit of goals. These may be proximate pur-
poses of knowledge and the like, and extremely important ones to boot, 
but the ultimate purpose of knowledge is to contemplate the truth and 
to rest in it. This is the classical view of Aristotle, Augustine and 
Aquinas, and I can think of no better.'" The vita activa subserves the vita 
contemplativa. The worldly hustle is for the sake of contemplative 
repose. Functionalism can make partial sense of the 'hustle' side of our 
mental lives, but it is hopeless when it comes to the 'repose' side -
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which is why it cannot accommodate qualia.65 
IV. Conclusion 
The punchline is that one cannot just tack local physicalism onto the-
ism and evade the question of how positions so disparate in substance 
and motivation can cohere ontologically. One should not overlook the 
fact that for the majority of their adherents, physicalism and theism rep-
resent competing Weltanschauungen.66 Physicalists tend to be scientific 
naturalists who draw their inspiration from, and pin their hopes on, the 
advance of science, a science that Smart says "is increasingly giving us a 
viewpoint whereby organisms are able to be seen as physico-chemical 
mechanisms ... ," and according to which there is "nothing in the world 
but increasingly complex arrangements of physical constituents."h? Thus 
Baker sounds like a good scientific naturalist when she writes that "what 
we now know about nature renders untenable the idea of a human per-
son as consisting, even in part, of an immaterial soul capable of indepen-
dent existence."6S But whereas Smart's rejection of both God and the 
soul is coherent, even if mistaken, Baker's half-way naturalism and 
selective physicalism is, on the face of it, incoherent. It would be inter-
esting to know what marvelous scientific knowledge renders substance 
dualism untenable; but if there is such knowledge, it would also tend to 
disqualify the dualism of nonphysical God and physical universe. 
So the theistic friends of physicalism have their work cut out for 
them. It is not enough to argue against dualism,"" or to argue that such 
doctrines as the resurrection of the dead do not presuppose dualism. 
One must tackle the more fundamental question of how mind can strad-
dle such a deep categorial divide as that between the physical and the 
nonphysical. I do not assume that this question cannot be answered, or 
that the arguments sketched above are absolutely compelling. I am 
merely urging that this is a question that cannot be ignored.70 
Chandler, Arizona 
NOTES 
1. J. McT. E. McTaggart, The Nature of Existence, vol. II (Cambridge 
Universitv Press, 1927), Ch. XLIII. 
2. Peter van Inwagen, Metaphysics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1993), chs. 9 and 10. See also his "Dualism and Materialism: Athens and 
Jerusalem?" Faitiz and Philosophy, vol. 12, no. 4 (October 1995), pp. 475-488. 
Another Christian materialist is Clifford Williams. See his "Christian 
Materialism and the Parity Thesis," International Journal for the Philosophy of 
Religion vol. 39, no. 1 (February 1996), pp. 1-14; and "The Irrelevance of 
Nonmaterial Minds," Christian Scholar's Review (1983), pp. 310-323. 
Note that the physicalist about human beings does not "deny the mind" 
(unless he is an eliminativist), but does "deny the soul." The question about 
minds is not whether there are any, but what they are, physicalism being one 
sort of answer. But plug "souls" for "minds" in the foregoing sentence and 
the result is something less than intelligible. The primary question about 
COULD A CLASSICAL THEIST BE A PHYSICALIST? 177 
souls is precisely whether there are any, just as the primary question about 
God is whether He exists. It would be either absurd or an unmotivated plea 
for linguistic reform to say: "Of course, people have souls, the only question 
is their ontological assay." 
3. My concern is with the co-tenability of classical theism and physical-
ism. According to John F. Post, "Even theism can be accommodated within 
a nonreductive physicalism .... " (The Faces of Existence: An Essay in 
Nonreductive Metaphysics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 18) But 
it turns out that Post's theism is nonclassical. For one thing, God for Post is 
not included in the ontological inventory. 
4. I shall use these terms interchangeably in accordance with current 
usage. An alternative would be to use "materialism" for that form of physi-
calism which is based on a seventeenth century conception of the physical. 
5. An entity is concrete just in case it can enter into a causal relation. 
An entity is physical just in case it is a microphysical item or composed of 
microphysical items. 
6. David Lewis, "New Work for a Theory of Universals," Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy, vol. 61, no. 4 (December 1983), p. 361. Lewis goes on to 
refine his preliminary definition in ways that need not concern us. 
7. Tim Crane, "PhYSicalism (2): Against Physicalism," A Companion to 





Van Inwagen, op. cit., p. 151. 
Thomas Nagel, What does it all Mean? (Oxford University Press, 1987), 
10. Galen Strawson, 'The Experiential and the Non-Experiential," in The 
Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate eds. Warner and Szubka 
(Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1996), p. 71. 
11. Peter Forrest, God without the Supernatural: A Defense of Scientific 
Theism (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 166. 
12. Ibid. 
13. Ibid., pp. 166-167. 
14. The denial that mentality has an intrinsic nature will be taken up 
infra in a section on functionalism. 
15. Arthur W. Collins, The Nature of Mental Things (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), p. 19. 
16. If arguments are wanted, see Owen Flanagan, Consciousness 
Reconsidered (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 22-28. 
17. Do not confuse realization and instantiation (exemplification). If 
property P realizes property Q, it does not follow that P instantiates Q; if 
individual a instantiates P, it does not follow that a realizes P. For more on 
realization, see note 47 below. 
18. Jaegwon Kim, "Epiphenomenal and Supervenient Causation," in 
Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays (Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), p. 98. 
19. Cf. J. Kim, "Concepts of Supervenience" in Supervenience and Mind, 
op. cit., pp. 64-65. 
20. Ibid., p. 68. 
21. Peter Forrest, "Physicalism and Classical Theism," Faith and 
Philosophy, vol. 13, no. 2 (April 1996), pp. 186-187. 
22. Another speculative assumption needed is that no two worlds in 
which God creates are such that God's relations to his creation in the one 
world are different from his relations to his creation in the other. 
23. J. Kim, '''Strong' and 'Global' Supervenience Revisited" in 
178 Faith and Philosophy 
Supervenience and Mind, op. cit., p. 85. 
24. Ibid. 
25. Ibid., p. 86. 
26. Vide Kim, "Supervenience for Multiple Domains," in Supervenience 
and Mind, op. cit., pp. 109-130, esp. sec. 3. 
27. See note 47 below for more on "realization." 
28. John R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press, 1992), p. 125. 
29. Ibid. 
30. Ibid. 
31. Jaegwon Kim, '''Downward Causation' in Emergentism and 
Nonreductive Physicalism," in Emergence or Reduction? eds. Beckermann, 
Flohr, Kim (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1992), pp. 119-138. 
32. Ibid., p. 133. 
33. William Hasker, "Emergentism," Religious Studies 18 (1982), pp. 473-
488. 
34. Ibid., p. 475. 
35. E. J. Lowe, Subjects of Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), p. 78. 
36. Searle, op. cit., p. 85. 
37. Searle, op. cit., p. 112. 
38. Searle, op. cit., p. 112. 
39. Lowe, op. cit., p. 89. 
40. This assumes that strong emergentism counts as physicalism. This 
may be doubted. If it is doubted, then my overall argument in this paper is 
rendered all the stronger. Cf. J. Kim, 'The Nonreductivist's Troubles with 
Mental Causation" in Supervenience and Mind, op. cit., p. 356. 
41. Cf. Hasker, art. cit., pp. 475-476. 
42. Compare Samuel Alexander's nonclassical view that deity is an 
emergent property: "God is the whole world as possessing the quality of 
deity." Space, Time and Deity, vol. II (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1979), p. 353. 
43. A state of affairs S is narrowly logically possible just in case the logi-
cal form of the sentence formulating S has some true substitution instances. 
Such states of affairs are not ruled out by logic alone. Thus 'Some colors are 
sounds' denotes a state of affairs that is narrowly logically possible, since the 
form Some Fs are Gs has some true substitution instances, e.g., 'Some theists 
are physicalists.' But this state of affairs is obviously not broadly logically, 
or metaphysically, possible. 
44. Eleonore Stump, "Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and 
Materialism without Reductionism," Faith and Philosophy, vol. 12, no. 4 
(October 1995), p. 519. 
45. Ibid., p. 520. 
46. Ibid., p. 515. 
47. I should also point out that the claim that the human soul is a form 
"created directly by God and infused into matter" (515) does not sit well 
with the claim that Aquinas "takes the soul to be something essentially 
immaterial or configurational but nonetheless realized in material compo-
nents." (505 Abstract, my emphasis) As Kim points out, "The talk of 'real-
ization' is not metaphysically neutral: the idea that mental properties are 
'realized' or 'implemented' by physical properties carries with it a certain 
ontological picture of mental properties as derivative and dependent. There 
is the suggestion that when we look at concrete reality there is nothing over 
and beyond instantiations of physical properties and relations, and that the 
instantiation on a given occasion of an appropriate physical property in the 
COULD A CLASSICAL THEIST BE A PHYSICALIST? 179 
right contextual (often causal) setting simply counts as, or constitutes, an 
instantiation of a mental property on that occasion." (J. Kim, "Multiple 
Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction" in Supervenience and Mind, 
op.cit., pp. 313-314.) 
48. Lynne Rudder Baker, "Need a Christian be a Mind/Body Dualist?" 
Faith and Philosophy vol. 12, no. 4 (October 1995), P. 494. 
49. Ibid. 
50. [bid., p. 493. 
51. Searle, op. cit., p. 9. 
52. "Intrinsic nature" may smack of pleonasm, but in mitigation I plead 
the meaningfulness, though not the truth, of the functionalist dictum, 
"Mental phenomena have a purely relational nature." 
53. D. M. Armstrong and Norman Malcolm, Consciousness and Causality 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), p. 157. 
54. Ibid. 
55. What follows is my take on an argument presented by Ted 
Honderich in "Functionalism, Identity Theories, the Union Theory" in 
Warner and Szubka eds., op. cit., p. 220 ff. 
56. Cf. John R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1992), pp. 65-70; John Foster, The Immaterial Self: A Defence of the 
Cartesian Dualist Conception of the Mind (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 80-
96. 
57. Cf. William P. Alston, "Functionalism and Theological Language," 
reprinted in Readings in the Philosophy of Religion: An Analytic Approach ed. B. 
Brody (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1992), p. 355. 
58. Peter Forrest has suggested to me via e-mail that classical theism is 
compatible with the claim that necessarily God creates some universe(s) 
even though God is free not to. "For the necessity is due to God necessarily 
having on balance good reason to create and necessarily not being subject to 
irrational forces." I find this unpersuasive. If a free agent is one who could 
have done otherwise, then there is at least one metaphysically possible 
world in which God does otherwise than create. 
59. Would bringing in the doctrine of the Trinity help? Peter Forrest 
(private communication) suggests that "functional properties could manifest 
themselves within the Trinity." One would have to see an elaboration of 
this view before one could assess it. 
60. John Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1992), p. 69. Searle's italics have been suppressed. 
61. See Alston, art. cit. 
62. Alston, art. cit. p. 351. 
63. As Alston would no doubt agree. 
64. Cf. Josef Pieper, Leisure: The Basis of Culture, trans. A. Oru (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1964). 
65. Cf. R. M. Adams, "Qualia," Faith and Philosophy, vol. 12, no. 4 
(October 1995), pp. 472-474. 
66. Compare Alvin Plantinga's vision of human history as the arena of a 
great "three-way contest between theism, perennial naturalism, and creative 
anti-realism" in "Science: Augustinian or Ouhemian?" Faith and Philosophy, 
vol. 13, no. 3 (July 1996), p. 369. 
67. J. J. c. Smart, "Sensations and Brain Processes," The Mind/Brain 
Identity Theory, ed. C. V. Borst (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), p. 53. 
68. Lynne Rudder Baker, art. cit., p. 502. 
69. Not only for the reasons given in the body of this paper, but also for 
the reason that idealism is an alternative that cannot be dismissed out of 
180 Faith and Philosophy 
hand. Cf. John Foster, "The Succinct Case for Idealism," Objections to 
Physicalism ed. Howard Robinson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 293-
313. 
70. I am grateful to Peter Forrest, William Hasker, William Wainwright, 
Clifford Williams and an anonymous Faith and Philosophy referee for their 
comments and correspondence. Ideas for this paper were first tried out in a 
graduate metaphysics seminar at Middle Eastern Technical University, 
Ankara, Turkey. Many thanks to my students and especially to the profes-
sors who attended: Murat Bac, David Davenport, David Gruenberg and 
Erdinc Sayan. 
